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Abstract
Recently, we demonstrated using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that the outcome of free decisions can be
decoded from brain activity several seconds before reaching conscious awareness. Activity patterns in anterior frontopolar
cortex (BA 10) were temporally the first to carry intention-related information and thus a candidate region for the
unconscious generation of free decisions. In the present study, the original paradigm was replicated and multivariate
pattern classification was applied to functional images of frontopolar cortex, acquired using ultra-high field fMRI at 7 Tesla.
Here, we show that predictive activity patterns recorded before a decision was made became increasingly stable with
increasing temporal proximity to the time point of the conscious decision. Furthermore, detailed questionnaires exploring
subjects’ thoughts before and during the decision confirmed that decisions were made spontaneously and subjects were
unaware of the evolution of their decision outcomes. These results give further evidence that FPC stands at the top of the
prefrontal executive hierarchy in the unconscious generation of free decisions.
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Introduction
As humans, we experience the ability to consciously choose our
actions as well as the time at which we perform them. It has been
postulated, however, that this subjective experience of freedom may
be no more than an illusion [1,2] and even our goals and
motivations can operate outside of our consciousness [3]. Early
studies discovered the presence of a so-called readiness-potential (or
Bereitschafts-potential, BP), a slow negative potential shift in EEG
activity that precedes voluntary movement [4]. Libet et al.
demonstrated that the readiness-potential also precedes the
conscious awareness of initiating the movement by several hundred
milliseconds, and was therefore attributed to unconscious processes
preceding voluntary actions [5]. The readiness-potential was
believed to originate from the SMA/pre-SMA and the anterior
cingulate motor areas [6,7]. There is indeed some evidence that the
SMA/pre-SMA is involved in focusing on self-initiated actions and
performing self-initiated movements [1,8–13].
The early studies by Libet et al. have been criticized for several
reasons. It has been questioned whether the timing judgments
were reliable, given that the time-window between reported
intention and movement was short (about half a second) and
attention to aspects of timing could cause additional distortions
[14–17]. Because the original study only investigated the readiness
potential from movement-related brain regions, it is further
possible that pre-SMA/SMA might only be involved in late stages
of motor planning, while other higher cognitive control regions
might be more likely candidates for planning the decision outcome
[18–20]. Furthermore, it is important to investigate whether any
choice-predictive signals reflect an unspecific, global preparation
of a decision or whether they are related to the specific outcome of
a decision, as suggested in subsequent work based on lateralized
readiness potentials [21].
In recent years, the combination of multivariate pattern
classification with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
has yielded a novel way to address this problem [22–26]. These
new approaches have previously been used to investigate the
encoding of the content of decisions and abstract task rules [27–
29] and indeed have already given new insights into the realm of
free decisions. In a recent study, participants were asked to freely
and spontaneously decide to press either a left or right button at
their own pace [30]. A visually presented continuous letter stream,
refreshed every 500 ms, served as a clock, which participants used
to indicate the time at which they first became aware of their
intention to press the left or right button. Multivariate pattern
classification was applied to the fMRI data from discrete time-bins
preceding each decision to search for information encoding
throughout the whole brain. This approach made it possible to
resolve the major pitfalls of previous studies: First, this approach
allowed the investigation of brain activity many seconds prior to a
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activation changes, it can be used to find regions that encode the
specific content of an intention. It was possible to decode the
decision outcomes of such free motor decisions from the pole of
anterior medial prefrontal cortex (BA 10) and the precuneus/
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), up to 7 s before subjects were
aware of their intention [30]. The results clearly pointed to
frontopolar cortex (FPC) as one possible site of origin for free
decisions. The decision outcome was encoded in fine-grained
spatial activation patterns that were not detectable using more
conventional univariate analyses.
Here we replicated the original study using ultra-high field
fMRI on a 7-Tesla scanner, which allowed us to acquire images
with 16161m m
3 voxels. Specifically, we were interested in the
role of frontopolar cortex and thus only brain images from anterior
FPC were recorded, which allowed a higher spatial resolution of
the target region and a better temporal resolution of the early
components of the decision making process. These improvements
allowed us to explicitly investigate the temporal stability of these
early decision-related patterns, which was not addressed in the
original study [30]. Furthermore, after the scanning session we
assessed our subjects’ behaviour and their thoughts during the
experiment to investigate factors that may have biased the decision
outcomes. This provided evidence in determining whether early
predictive activity patterns already reflect conscious aspects of the
decision process or whether these are related to truly unconscious
components of evolving intentions.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
The study was approved by the local ethics committee at the
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences,
Leipzig, Germany. The study was carried out in accordance to the
Declaration of Helsinki. Informed written consent was obtained
from each subject before the study.
Participants
Twelve right-handed subjects (5 female, average age 24 years,
age range 22–29 years) participated in the fMRI experiment. All
subjects were students of the University of Leipzig, enrolled in
various fields of study. All were healthy and had normal or
corrected to normal vision, and had no history of neurological
disease. Suitable subjects were selected by means of behavioural
pre-tests, conducted within the 2 weeks preceding the fMRI
session. These pre-tests consisted of 5 blocks of the same task as
used for the fMRI experiment and ensured that only those subjects
who inherently fulfilled important criteria were selected for the fMRI
session. First, the frequency with which a subject chose each of the
two possible outcomes (left button or right button) needed to be
balanced, meaning that one option should not have been chosen
more than twice as often as the other. Second, we selected subjects
that ‘‘naturally’’ performed trials at a moderate pace (i.e., at a
speed of 15 to 50 seconds per trial). This pace allowed an optimal
separation of fMRI signals for different trials. These first two
criteria were not known to the subjects such that they had maximal
freedom in their decisions, but it was specifically emphasised that
their decisions should be unbiased and spontaneous. Third, based
on post-experimental questionnaires it was ensured that subjects
made spontaneous decisions and did not pre-plan them. The
behavioural performance from the fMRI session was evaluated
using the same criteria. We did not pre-select subjects according to
their level of intelligence or any other cognitive capacity. Data
from one subject (S4) was discarded from all analyses due to
relatively unbalanced decisions and exceptionally long trial
durations. Data from one run of another subject (S12) had to be
discarded due to technical problems with recording buttons.
Experimental Paradigm
A stream of stimulus screens was presented at a rate of 2 Hz,
(refreshed every 500 ms). Each stimulus frame displayed a central
letter on a dark background. Only consonants were used and were
presented in a pseudo-randomised order such that the same letter
never occurred twice within 8 consecutive frames. Subjects were
instructed to passively view the stream of letters, relax, and refrain
from thinking about the upcoming task. The index- and middle
fingers of both hands rested on 4 buttons of two joysticks. Subjects
were free to decide, at any time, to press the left or the right button
with the corresponding index finger. As soon as they were aware of
their decision, subjects were to note the letter presented on the
screen. The time at which subjects are first aware of their decision
will hereafter be referred to as the ‘‘decision time’’ in short.
Subjects were instructed to then immediately perform the chosen
action without any delay. Once a button was pressed with the
index finger, a response screen was presented for a variable delay
of 1, 1.5, 2 or 2.5 s. This screen contained three letters and an
asterisk arranged in a square. Subjects were then to indicate the
letter noted at the decision time by pressing the corresponding
button on the joystick, the four buttons now corresponding to the
position of the letters (or asterisk) on the screen. The three letters
always corresponded to the three letters shown immediately prior
to and including the button-press (0 s, 20.5 s and 21 s relative to
the button press). Their positions were also randomized. If subjects
were unable to recall the letter present at the time of the button
press, or if the relevant letter was not displayed, they were told to
select the asterisk (see Fig. 1). Using a letter stream as a timing
device allowed us to detect whether decisions were planned ahead
of time (see [30]). Upon completion of the trial, the stream of
stimuli resumed. Subjects again relaxed and passively viewed the
stream of stimuli until the next decision was spontaneously made.
Note that subjects were only instructed to relax and not to pre-plan
their decisions at any time; the pacing and the ratio of left and
right decisions were deliberately left to them in order to avoid any
artificial restrictions of the free decision process. As described
above, pre-tests were used to select only those subjects for the
fMRI session who inherently showed optimal behavioural
performance.
After the scanning session, subjects completed a questionnaire
about their subjective experiences with the experiment. They were
asked to report their thoughts and behaviour during the
experiment, even if these had contradicted the task instructions.
Participants were asked to rate on a five-point scale (0=never to
4=always) I) how often they made a decision earlier during the
trial but waited before executing the button press; II) their
spontaneity throughout the experiment (0=not spontaneous at all to
4=very spontaneous); III) how often they explicitly thought about the
timing of their decisions (0=never to 4=always). Additionally, they
had to describe IV) the content of their thoughts between trials,
and V) if they noticed any changes in their performance during the
experiment.
Functional Imaging
Functional imaging data was acquired using a 7-Tesla whole-
body MR scanner (MAGNETOM 7T; Siemens, Germany) with
an 8 channel array head coil (RAPID Biomedical, Rimpar,
Germany). A gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence was
used for functional imaging (TR=1500 ms, TE=23 ms, flip
angle=90u, matrix size 64664, in-plane resolution 161 mm).
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on the SAR limit of individual subjects, and covered the most
anterior part of prefrontal cortex. In order to minimise signal
dropout due to the frontal sinuses, the slices were tilted away from
the coronal orientation by an angle of 30.2u to the transverse plane
(due to the anatomy of individual subjects and their position in the
scanner, the angle was 37.6u in two cases and 36.0u in one case).
Particularly for ultra-high field strength, signal dropout and
distortions in frontopolar cortex can be substantial. This setup
was found to maximally reduce signal distortions and dropouts for
the present study because it allowed us to use a small field of view
(FOV), and thus a short echo train length, in order to cover most of
anterior prefrontal cortex with maximal exclusion of the air-filled
cavities compared to axial slices (Fig. 2). However, using this setup
no region beyond frontopolar cortex could be covered. Data was
acquiredfor10functionalruns,eachlasting5 minutes(200volumes
per run). The first two volumes of each run were discarded by
default to allow for magnetic saturation effects. Additionally, a
structural T1-weighted image was acquired for each subject for co-
registration (176 transversal slices; TR=3840 ms, TE=268 ms;
voxel resolution 16161m m
3). During the scanning sessions,
stimuli were presented via a projector with a resolution of
10246768 pixels (refresh rate of 60 Hz) that projected from behind
the head-end of the scanner onto a screen. Subjects lay supine in the
scanner and viewed the projection via a mirror. Responses were
recorded using a set of two custom-engineered, deconstructed
Nintendo Wii joysticks, each with two buttons operated with the
index- and middle fingers of either hand.
Multivariate Pattern Analysis
Multivariate pattern classification was used to analyse the data.
The analysis sought to identify regions within FPC that allowed
subjects’ decisions for left and right to be decoded from fine-
grained patterns of activity as measured by the BOLD signal
preceding the subjects’ conscious awareness of their decisions.
Chance level for correct prediction was 50%.
Figure 1. Experimental paradigm. Subjects were presented with a stream of constantly changing white letters on dark background. The screen
was refreshed every 500 ms. The task was to freely and spontaneously decide to press a response button with the left or the right index finger
(illustrated by upper circles; decision for left button in example illustrated by filled circle) whenever they felt the urge to do so. They were instructed
to note the letter displayed on the screen when they became aware of their intention and to immediately perform the button press (the letter H in
the example; red circles are for illustration and were not presented). Following the button press, a response screen was presented. Three letters and
an asterisk were presented in the four corners of the screen, the letters being those shown during and immediately prior to the button press. Subjects
indicated the letter that was visible at the time of the decision by pressing the button corresponding to its position on screen (recalled letter H,
indicated by upper right button in example). If they could not remember the letter or if the relevant letter was not present, they indicated this with
the asterisk. After the response was given, the next trial started and subjects were instructed to return to a relaxed state before making a new
decision. The general paradigm was taken from Soon et al. [30].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612.g001
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the first image of the first run using SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.
ac.uk/spm/). No additional normalization or smoothing was
performed at that stage in order to maximize the sensitivity for
information encoded in the fine-grained voxel patterns [24,31,32].
A finite impulse response (FIR) predictor was used to model fMRI
responses, as it was not known whether the profile of the fMRI
time course adheres to the generic haemodynamic response
function in this situation. This procedure also allowed time-
resolved decoding to be implemented [29,30]. Left-button trials
and right-button trials were modelled as two separate conditions,
each with 20 FIR regressors. Each regressor modelled a time-bin
of 1.5 s (1 TR), covering a 30-second time period around each
trial. The 10
th time-bin was defined as that in which a decision was
made. The first 10 regressors therefore modelled the 15 seconds
preceding (and including) each decision, the last 10 covered the
15 seconds following the decision. Invalid trials (in which subjects
were unable to recall a letter) were modelled separately, again
using 20 FIR predictors and assigning the 10
th predictor as that in
which the button was pressed. These trials were excluded from the
pattern classification analyses. To minimise unaccounted-for
variance in the fMRI data, the second button-presses with which
subjects indicated the letter present at the decision time were
modelled as covariates. Left-handed and right-handed button-
presses were modelled separately, and convolved with a standard
haemodynamic response function (HRF).
In the next step, a ‘‘searchlight’’ decoding procedure was
applied to the data of each subject separately, using the activity
patterns of different local spherical voxel clusters [26,27,29,30].
This way the choice-predictive information encoded in a spherical
cluster of voxels at each position in the brain can be estimated
without making any a-priori assumptions as to the location of the
information (Fig. 2C). As a direct replication of Soon et al. [30],
the searchlight radius was kept at r=3 voxels. Note that in the
original study the voxel size was 36363m m
3 while the reduction
of voxel size in the present study to 16161m m
3 yielded a
searchlight 27 times smaller. Nevertheless, information decoding
was based on the same number of data points (voxels) in both
cases. The total number of voxels in the whole search volume in
anterior PFC was comparable to that in a whole-brain data set
with the standard 36363m m
3 voxel resolution acquired on a 3-T
scanner. For every voxel in the volume (denoted by vi), a spherical
searchlight cluster of N voxels was defined around it, such that all
voxels in the cluster (denoted by c(1…N)) lay within a radius of
3 voxels of vi. For every voxel in c(1…N), the parameter estimates
for all 20 time-bins were extracted from each run, separately from
left-decision and right-decision trials. These were transformed into
two N-dimensional pattern vectors (one corresponding to left-
decision trials, the other to right-decision trials) for each of the
20 time-bins, representing the spatial activation patterns for
both decisions at all 20 points in time. To assess how much
discriminative intention-related information was contained in
these patterns at each time-point, pattern vectors (each time-point
separately) from nine of the ten runs (eight of the nine runs for the
subject with one excluded run) were first assigned to a ‘‘training
data set’’. This set was used to train a linear support vector
machine (SVM) pattern classifier (LIBSVM implementation,
http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/,cjlin/libsvm) to discriminate be-
tween patterns corresponding to the two different decision
outcomes (or intentional states), using a fixed regularization
parameter C=1 [33]. The classifier estimated a decision boundary
separating the two classes of patterns in N-dimensional space
where N is the number of voxels in the local spherical cluster (also
see [34]). The amount of intention-related information contained
in these patterns was then assessed by using the decision boundary
to classify the trials in the independent ‘‘test data set’’, taken from
the remaining run, as belonging to the left-decision or right-
decision condition. This procedure was repeated 10 times, each
time using a different run as the independent test data set, resulting
in a 10-fold cross-validation. The pattern classification results from
each repetition were averaged and assigned to the central voxel of
the searchlight cluster as its decoding accuracy.
The entire procedure was repeated by assigning in turn every
voxel in the brain volume as the central voxel of the searchlight
cluster, yielding a 3D map of decoding accuracies throughout the
imaged volume. Furthermore, such a 3D decoding accuracy map
was obtained for each of the 20 time-points. These maps represent
the amount of intention-related information encoded in the local
neural networks at each location in the brain (of each individual
subject), at the time-point from which the parameter estimates
were taken. In the next step, the subjects’ individual decoding
accuracy maps were normalized to MNI-space. For this, the
functional images were first co-registered to the individual high-
resolution T1-weighted structural whole-brain image, which was
acquired during the same scanning session. The T1-weighted
image was normalized to the MNI T1-template image as
implemented in SPM2. The normalization parameters were then
applied to the decoding accuracy maps. These were further
Figure 2. Illustration of EPI image, slice positioning and decoding approach. A) Example of one slice of one participant’s EPI image. B)
Structural T1 image from the same subject displaying the positioning of the example slice (dotted line) and slice coverage (blue box). For each
subject, 21–25 coronal slices (16161m m
3, without gap) were positioned such that the most anterior part of frontopolar cortex was covered. Due to
the optimized slice positioning, which allowed the use of a small field of view (FOV) and a short echo train length, a relative small part of the air-filled
cavities was included. This improved the quality of the EPIs and reduced signal dropouts and distortions. C) The parameter estimates from the FIR
model were used for multivariate pattern classification. A moving ‘‘searchlight’’ algorithm was implemented using a radius of 3 voxels in order to
decode the outcome of the upcoming decision from each position in frontopolar cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612.g002
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were not shared by all subjects were masked out. For each time-
point, group level analyses were performed across subjects. The
decoding accuracy maps from the time-bins preceding the decision
(time-bins 1–10) were analysed, yielding a statistical parametric
map of voxel clusters (using a 5 voxel threshold) that displayed
decoding accuracies greater than chance level (50% for two
decisions) during the 15 seconds preceding (and up to) the
conscious decision time (using a threshold of p,.05 FDR
corrected). It was therefore possible to track changes in the
amount of information encoded in different regions over time, and
in particular, to search for a build-up of intention-related
information prior to subjects’ conscious awareness of their own
intentions, as observed by Soon et al. [30].
Temporal pattern stability
The goal of this analysis was to investigate the spatial-temporal
profile [35] of the time-bins that allowed the prediction of free
decisions before they reach conscious awareness. Individual data
from the searchlight yielding the highest decoding accuracy across
subjects (see Results and Fig. 3A) preceding the decision was
analysed across time-bins for each subject. For this, this
coordinate, which was established after normalizing the individual
3-dimensional decoding accuracy maps, was transformed back
into individual space. The spherical cluster with radius r=3 voxels
was again constructed around this position and the spatial
activation patterns for each decision were extracted and
transformed into pattern vectors, separately for each run and
individually for each subject.
The pattern vectors from single time-bins were then combined
for each decision by I) simply averaging vectors in steps of (i) two, (ii)
three or (iii) four time-bins or by II) concatenating vectors in the same
steps. The multivariate pattern classification analysis was run again
on these new vectors, exactly as described before; the difference
was that there were a smaller number of time steps per analysis. If
averaging across earlier time-bins does not reduce the decoding
accuracy, this would mean the spatial activation patterns display a
consistently high temporal stability in those time-bins. Finally,
correlation analyses were also conducted between the pattern
vectors of adjacent time-bins (separately for each subject and each
Figure 3. Decoding of upcoming motor decisions from frontopolar cortex. A) The figure displays a region in left frontopolar cortex [223 59
29] from which decoding was possible significantly above chance (50%) using a threshold of p,.05 (FDR corrected; voxel-threshold 5 voxels). FPC
only showed significant decoding accuracies in the time-bins preceding the decision. B) The graph displays the average time-course of decoding
accuracies, taken from the central voxel of the searchlight cluster that showed the highest decoding accuracy. Error bars represent standard errors.
The time-bin of the conscious intention is indicated by the red bar and is labelled as time 0. Time-points preceding the conscious awareness of the
intention are labelled as negative numbers (units=seconds, relative to decision); time-points following the decision are therefore positive. One time-
bin corresponds to 1.5 s. Coordinates displayed are MNI coordinates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612.g003
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in more detail.
Since the results did not differ for left and right decisions, the
results are reported for each time-bin for all the analyses. Please
note that all these subsequent analyses only aimed to specify the
role of the best searchlight cluster and not to select voxels for
further dependent statistical analyses, which would have been
circular [36]. Also note that the chosen cluster was the best
decoding cluster averaged across subjects. This cluster therefore did
not represent the optimal decoding cluster in individual subjects.
Analysing the optimal clusters in individual subjects, however,
would have carried the risk of arbitrariness and was therefore
strictly avoided.
Univariate Control Analysis
The parameter estimates obtained from a GLM, based on
normalised and smoothed (3 mm FWHM) data, were used in a
conventional mass-univariate analysis. Again, a finite impulse
response (FIR) predictor was used to model fMRI responses
(identical to the analysis described above) and group level analyses
were performed across subjects for each time-point separately. The
purpose of this analysis was to investigate whether any voxels at
any time-point showed significant differences in activation
between the left-decision and right-decision trials.
Results
Behavioural Results
Subjects chose the left button on 51% of all trials, and the right
button 49% of all trials. There were only very few trials in which
subjects could not recall the letter present when their decision was
made (average 1% of all trials). In nearly all trials, subjects
indicated that the decision reached conscious awareness during the
presentation of the same letter or one letter before they pressed the
button (see Table 1 for details). Our criterion was that any subject
who showed highly unbalanced decisions (criterion: one option
was not chosen more than twice as often as the other), or had
exceptionally short or long trial durations (criterion: on average
,15 s or .50 s) were excluded from further analyses. One subject
(S4) was thus excluded. For nine of the remaining eleven subjects,
the individual probability of left and right decisions did not
significantly differ. Only two subjects tended to make more left
than right decisions (S1: x
2(1)=4.36; S2: x
2(1)=5.63; both p,.05)
In total, the average time lapsed between consecutive trials was
29.7 s (SD=9.29); an average of 11 trials was performed per
5 min run. This was even longer compared to the original study
[30]; spill-over effects from the previous trial therefore can not
explain the results.
In the post-experimental interviews subjects indicated that they
were able to relax and make spontaneous decisions. They reported
to rarely wait with the execution of the button press after being
aware of their intentions (scale from 0=never to 4=always;
M=0.9; SD=0.54), as instructed. They indicated having been
very spontaneous (M=3.3; SD=0.65) and they did not pay much
attention to the timing (M=1.0; SD=0.89). Most subjects
reported that they did not have specific thoughts they could
remember. Some reported having thought about (or mentally
read) the letters, some reported having occasionally thought about
daily activities but none reported having thought about the
decisions. Most subjects reported that they became more relaxed
through the experiment and that they either became more
spontaneous or that there was no change in spontaneity. This is
not surprising given that subjects were highly familiar with the
task, having completed 10 runs of prior training, and were able to
perform the task effortlessly. Comparable to the original study
[30], the distribution of sequence lengths (periods of the same
decision before a switch occurred) resembled an exponential
distribution, as expected for random behaviour. Furthermore, we
correlated the sequences of decisions from each run of each subject
with the sequence of decisions in the following run, in order to
control for the possibility that subjects might have simply repeated
fixed sequences of decisions over the experiment. None of these
correlations were significant for any of the subjects (all tests p..05;
average correlation r=2.11; range 2.27 to .07). For each subject
and within each functional run, we further analysed whether the
sequences of left and right decisions violated the assumption of a
random order (runs test as implemented in MATLAB, Math-
Works Inc., corrected for multiple tests). We note, however, that
Table 1. Behavioural results.
subject left [%] right [%] mean trial duration (SD) [s] letter indicated [mean] ‘‘*’’ indicated [%]
S1 56% 44% 20.7 (7.8) 20.19 1
S2 59% 41% 23.2 (5.5) 20.17 0
S3 46% 54% 24.0 (6.3) 20.13 1
S4 39% 61% 58.4 (20.4) 20.11 7
S5 50% 50% 46.4 (8.2) 20.17 0
S6 56% 44% 42.4 (8.0) 20.09 0
S7 50% 50% 26.8 (6.2) 20.13 0
S8 43% 57% 28.1 (7.1) 20.12 0
S9 50% 50% 36.2 (14.7) 20.07 4
S10 55% 45% 24.4 (8.9) 20.13 2
S11 45% 55% 36.6 (15.0) 20.93 5
S12 52% 48% 18.0 (4.0) 21.36 2
Note: left/right=percentage of left/right decisions across experiment; mean trial duration given for each subject in seconds; ‘‘letter indicated’’ refers to the number of
letters lapsed between the time at which a decision became conscious and the time at which the button was pressed (one letter=500 ms duration). On average, all
subjects indicated that the intention reached conscious awareness during the same time-bin (500 ms) or one time-bin earlier relative to the button press (0=same
time-bin, 21=preceding time bin); Subjects indicated by pressing the ‘‘*’’ that they did not remember the letter presented when they became aware of their decision.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612.t001
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functional run were very short, thus, this test has limited
informative value. The results showed that out of all 110 functional
runs from all 11 subjects, violations of the randomness assumption
could only be found in one single run (p=.004; all others p..05),
providing additional evidence that behaviour was spontaneous.
These results indicate that participants performed correctly and
that preplanning or other unaccounted-for activity cannot explain
the decoding results (see Table 2 for individual results).
Brain Imaging Results
Multivariate pattern classification analysis was used to search for
brain regions encoding subjects’ decision outcomes. We identified
a cluster in FPC from which subjects’ decisions could be decoded
before their intentions became conscious (i.e. time-bin 10, Fig. 3),
with statistically significant decoding accuracies of up to 57%
(SE=1.69; p,.05 FDR-corrected) just before the decision was
made (time-bin 9; see Fig. 3). This region was located in left
frontopolar cortex (MNI coordinates 223 59 29; see Fig. 4 for
individual searchlight clusters). The earliest time at which
decoding was possible was ,7.5 seconds (time-bin 4) before the
decision was reported to be consciously made. Taking into account
the temporal delay of the BOLD signal (which is in the order of a
few seconds), it is possible that these signals reflect processes up to
10 seconds before the actual decision.
Using a searchlight radius of r=4 voxels led to decreased
decoding accuracies and p-values for the same region. When the
radius was further increased, no significant results could be
achieved, possibly due to the increased dimensionality. In a control
analysis the accuracy maps from the time-bins after the decision
was made (time-bins 11–20) were contrasted against chance level.
No clusters could be found in FPC encoding any information
above chance level during this period. The same held true if
separate time-bins around the time of the motor response were
considered, matching the findings from the original study that
FPC only encoded the intentions before subjects were aware of
making a decision. The information was, as in the original study,
only encoded in fine-grained activation patterns rather than in the
average signal. Additional univariate analyses confirmed that there
was no significant difference between left and right decisions at any
time in individual voxels, even when a liberal threshold of p,.001
(uncorrected) was applied. This held true for the whole frontopolar
region as well as for the region from which decoding was possible.
The average BOLD signal did not increase at all until after the
decision was made (see Fig. 5B).
The subsequent decoding analysis using the best searchlight
cluster across all subjects showed that averaging across adjacent
time-bins led to lower decoding accuracies, the more time-bins
that were combined (Fig. 6). Concatenating time-bins, which is
combining spatial and temporal information before the decision,
still predicted the decision outcome with high accuracy (Fig. 6).
Concatenating was superior to averaging by trend, which suggests
that, in the time leading up to a decision, spatial patterns were not
uniform throughout, but carried more decision-related informa-
tion with increasing temporal proximity to the decision. In
subsequent correlation analyses we found that patterns from
consecutive time-bins nevertheless showed significant correlation.
Moreover, there was increasing pattern similarity with increasing
temporal proximity to the decision (peak r=.44; p,.05; Fig. 7).
After the time-point of the decision, the correlations dropped again
to a stable level. This auto-correlation curve closely mimicked the
time-course of decoding accuracies (Fig. 7). Thus, activity patterns
became more similar and more informative the closer the decision-
maker was to becoming aware of the decision. After the decision
was made, some pattern stability was sustained but the patterns no
longer carried information about the decision.
Discussion
This study aimed to assess whether local spatial activity patterns
in FPC, which were previously found to encode unconscious
intentions [30], display temporal stability over time. Using ultra-
high field fMRI at 7T, allowing a voxel resolution of 16161m m
3,
we could replicate the findings of the original study. We could also
demonstrate that activity patterns preceding the time-point of the
conscious decision became increasingly similar with increasing
temporal proximity to the decision. Our behavioural data and
questionnaire results further supported that no conscious processes
Table 2. Individual post-experimental interview results.
subject Quest. I Quest. II Quest. III Quest. IV Quest. V
S1 2 4 2 the day, girlfriend, relaxing nothing
S2 1 4 1 letters, nothing more relaxed
S3 1 3 3 nothing more relaxed
S4 excluded - - - -
S5 1 3 1 nothing nothing
S6 1 3 0 nothing nothing
S7 1 3 0 nothing decisions slightly faster
S8 1 3 1 letters more relaxed, spontaneous
S9 0 4 1 letters, uni, holidays forgot letters few trials
S10 1 2 1 letters nothing
S11 0 3 0 nothing decisions slighty slower
S12 1 4 1 nothing Nothing
Note: Question I: ‘‘How often did you make a decision earlier during the trial but waited with the button press?’’ (0=never; 4=always); Question II: ‘‘How would you rate
your spontaneity throughout the experiment?’’ (0=not spontaneous at all; 4=very spontaneous); Question III: ‘‘How often did you explicitly think about the timing of
your decisions?’’ (0=never; 4=always); Question IV: ‘‘What did you think about during the experiment, as far as you can remember?’’; Question V: ‘‘Did you notice any
changes in your behaviour during the experiment? If yes, what changed?’’ One subject (S4) was excluded from all analyses because of behavioural criteria.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612.t002
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attributable to unconscious components of evolving intentions.
Comparable to the original study [30] subjects’ intentions could
be read out approximately seven seconds before they became
conscious. Given the haemodynamic delay, it is likely that this
reflects neural processes that occurred even earlier by a few
seconds. The site of information encoding was found to be left
frontopolar cortex, also referred to as the rostral lateral prefrontal
cortex or the anterior prefrontal cortex, and approximating to the
most anterior part of Brodmann area 10 [37–39]. The same region
was identified in the original study but in the opposite hemisphere.
In the present study, we optimized the slice positioning to
minimize distortion effects and signal dropouts, which are a
common problem due to the proximity to frontal sinuses,
especially at higher field strength. Since the analysis only included
voxels that were present in all subjects, residual dropout in
individual subjects could have led the exclusion of more
informative voxels. Hence, our results might underestimate the
extent of the decision-related region. No information about the
subjects’ intentions was found after the decision was made, which
is also in line with the original findings that after the time of the
decision, information was only encoded in primary motor cortex
and pre-motor cortex [30]. These areas were not covered in the
present study. Due to the optimized slice positioning in the present
study, the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, which addition-
ally encoded early decision-related signals in the original study
[30], was also not covered. As demonstrated before, the procedure
used in both studies ensured that decoding could not be explained
by activity related to the previous trial. As in our previous work
[29,30] we used a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) model, which is
designed to separate effects of the current trial from the previous
and the following trial. This method is highly efficient as long as
both types of responses are roughly equally frequent, as here.
Importantly, subjects self-paced their decisions, ensuring that the
intervals between trails were variable, which makes the estimation
of the FIR model even more robust to carry-over effects. Second,
the time delay between the onset of predictive information in
frontopolar cortex and the end of the previous trial was on average
,15 seconds, and thus far beyond the relaxation time of the
haemodynamic response. The average trial duration in the present
study was even longer than in the original experiment, thus
making it less likely that spill-over effects from the previous trials
might have occurred. For the earliest time points in a trial we find
no predictive information (as would have been expected if carry-
over effects occurred). However, as time continues, we begin to see
information. Third, the temporal resolution was also improved
Figure 4. Individual searchlight clusters. Displayed are the spherical voxel clusters (with radius r=3 voxels) in frontopolar cortex of all subject
that yielded the highest decoding accuracy in the time-bin directly preceding the decision (21.5 s). Voxels responding preferentially to one decision
are colour-coded (magenta for left, aqua for right; sup=superior, ant=anterior, R=right). Grey transparent voxels did not show decision preference
or were not located in grey matter. Colours are scaled for better visualization. Informative patterns were different for each participant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612.g004
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study), further validating the original findings. Fourth, data from
one trial cannot be used to predict the trial preceding or following
it. Fifth, carry-over effects are further unlikely because the
distribution of response sequences resembled an exponential
distribution, as expected for random behaviour (Fig. 5A). Although
we do not believe and do not claim that our subjects produced
perfectly random sequences, our behavioral results suggest that
subjects made spontaneous decisions. This is probably because we
did not ask subjects to balance their decisions.
Interestingly, we observed an increase in similarity between
patterns with increasing temporal proximity to the conscious
decision. This increase in correlation was mirrored by the increase
in information content about the decision outcome. Thus, one
possible explanation for this finding is that during the unconscious
phase of intention-formation, the patterns slowly ‘‘evolved’’
towards the final conscious decision, comparable to a diffusion
process postulated for fast, stimulus-driven decisions [40]. This
hypothesis states that once a threshold is crossed (a certain pattern
is stable enough), a conscious decision is made and activation
patterns lose their predictive power afterwards. The remaining
(but reduced) pattern stability might be explained by the
dependence of sequentially acquired brain scans. Although there
was some tendency for patterns to remain stable for a few seconds
after the decision, there was no decodable information at these
post-decision time periods. Similarly, patterns during the initial
phase of the following trial were not informative. It was only later,
closer to the next decision in the next trial, that we again observed
a slow increase of pattern similarity and information encoding.
This again speaks against carry-over effects from the previous trial.
Our detailed behavioural analysis confirmed that subjects did not
use any systematic thoughts to consciously prepare their decision
ahead of time. They acted as instructed and were spontaneous. In
support of these findings, Soon et al. [30] did not observe any
encoding of the chosen movement in motor cortices before the
decision; however, this could be expected when subjects pre-plan a
motor response [29]. Here this analysis was not possible due to the
restriction of coverage to PFC which was necessary to achieve a
higher spatial resolution. We thus conclude that the early
informative spatial activation patterns in frontopolar cortex were
related to unconscious components of the intention. This again
supports the hypothesis of a slow unconscious diffusion process
towards a ‘‘prototypical’’ pattern in FPC, which is then related to
the conscious decision. It might be surprising that decision-related
information is encoded in the brain several seconds before the
decision becomes conscious, given that the task was rather simple.
One possibility is that random activity directly preceding the
decision might bias the decision outcome, as suggested for short
time periods [41]. This, however, is less likely for such long periods
as observed here. Our study might have facilitated the detection of
very early information by encouraging subjects to relax and refrain
from decision-related thoughts as well as by instructing subjects to
self-pace their decisions. By doing so, unlike most other studies,
our experiment was uniquely suited to investigate the early
evolution of intentions. Another possibility is that, even though we
have good evidence that our subjects’ behaviour was spontaneous,
there might still have been some urge to respond regularly to a
certain degree, which might only become detectable in longer
behavioural sequences than produced here. Such a bias, even
though outside subjects’ awareness, could potentially contribute to
the build-up of early brain activation patterns. It is important to
note that any temporal autocorrelation in the signals could cause a
correlation between choices in successive trials, even without a
conscious, deliberative link. Such autocorrelation might be
considered a very basic form of memory, but our conclusion that
choices can be predicted before awareness would remain
unchanged. Please also note that our study cannot provide
evidence for a causal relationship between the activation in
frontopolar cortex and the decision, e.g. because fMRI measures
neural decision-related processes only indirectly and prediction is
far from perfect. Our study also did not address the question of
whether inter-individual differences, e.g. in intelligence, imagina-
tiveness or other cognitive functions, might moderate the time-
scale in which a build-up of decision-related activation patterns
can be observed. Thus, one intriguing question for future research
will be whether the onset of unconscious decision formation that
can be decoded from brain activity might in turn be predictable by
some core cognitive ability.
The present study supports the hypothesis that prefrontal cortex
is a core region for free decisions. Presently, it is believed that the
anterior prefrontal cortex lies at the top of a hierarchically
Figure 5. Sequence length and univariate fMRI results. A)
Histogram of sequence length. Displayed is the average percentage of
sequences of N trials of the same decision (left or right) before
switching to the other decision. It resembles an exponential distribu-
tion; fitted model: f(x)=100*c*e
2c*x, with c=0.917, RMSD=2.739 (red
curve). This suggests that subjects made random decisions. Error bars
are standard errors. B) The graph shows the percent signal change
(average BOLD estimates from 20 FIR predictors) during left-decision
and right-decision trials for the central searchlight voxel [223 59 29]
that demonstrated the highest accuracy in decoding the decision
outcome prior to the conscious decision. For both conditions, the signal
increased only after the decision (red bar) and came back down to
baseline in the next ten seconds. Significant differences between left
and right decisions were not found for this cluster. No region could be
found in the imaged volume that displayed a difference between left
and right, even when a liberal threshold of p,.001 (uncorrected) was
used. Time-points preceding the conscious awareness of the intention
are labelled as negative numbers (units=seconds, relative to decision);
time-points following the decision are therefore positive. One time-bin
corresponds to 1.5 s. Coordinates are given as MNI coordinates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612.g005
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represents sensory input information in its most abstract form and
guidescognitivecontrol[42].Itmaintainstheabstractrepresentation
of a desired act, together with context-relevant information such as
environmental context, task-rules, motivation and potential out-
comes [29,43–45]; the motor plan for the execution of this act is
Figure 6. Temporal pattern stability. Temporal-spatial decoding analysis. The spatial activation patterns from the searchlight cluster, which was
found to give best results in decoding accuracy (MNI 223 59 29), was extracted in the individual subjects’ data. The original patterns from the time-
bins (1 time-bin=1.5 s) were combined by concatenating (white) and averaging (grey) the respective pattern vectors in steps of either (i) two time-
bins, (ii) three time-bins, or (iii) four time-bins. The reference time-bin for vector concatenation was the time point of the decision (time 0 s). The
resulting pattern vectors additionally represented temporal information for the best searchlight cluster and were used for multivariate decoding.
Temporal-spatial information was found to be highest directly preceding the decision and was still present when four time bins were concatenated.
Concatenating was superior to averaging by trend.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612.g006
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recruitment of single motor units in primary motor cortex [46].
Medial prefrontal cortex might additionally contribute to action
planning by processing self-related information [47], in this case,
one’s intentions; it was also found to encode freely chosen decisions
during a delay [27].
Of the different regions in prefrontal cortex, however, evidence
from cytoarchitectural studies suggests that frontopolar cortex has
the necessary architecture to support the highest level of processing
within prefrontal cortex. First, it has the greatest number of
dentritic spines per cell, and overall spine density is higher than for
all other areas of prefrontal cortex. Furthermore, it is the only
supramodal area that is connected solely with other supramodal
areas, has less laminar differentiation compared to other prefrontal
areas, and its connections within PFC point towards a hierarchi-
cally high level of processing [20,48,49]. Given these properties,
frontopolar cortex is an optimal candidate for the representation of
the most abstract contents [20]. Current hypotheses about the
function of this region are based mainly on functional imaging
studies (as this region is markedly smaller and difficult to access in
primate electrophysiology). Presently, the cognitive processes in
which frontopolar cortex has been implicated include: processing
of internal states [50], modulation of episodic memory retrieval
[51,52], prospective memory [53], relational reasoning [54,55],
the integration of cognitive processes [39] and cognitive branching
[19]. In this last model, frontopolar cortex was suggested to control
long-term plans and to generate new cognitive sequences [19].
This is supported by recent findings showing that frontopolar
cortex also tracks the advantage of alternative action plans and
might initiate switching [56]. Burgess et al. [57] proposed that the
type of processing in frontopolar cortex is determined by the
context, allowing either stimulus-oriented (i.e., pertaining to the
external environment) or stimulus-independent (i.e., pertaining to
the internally generated representations) processing to occur.
These theories are in line with a role of frontopolar cortex in the
generation of free decision as demonstrated by Soon et al. [30] and
the present study.
One possibility is that neurons in frontopolar cortex could be
tuned to different decision outcomes, while having the capacity to
be flexibly re-coded depending on task demands as previously
suggested for prefrontal cortex [58,59]. This mechanism would
also allow different types of intentions to be encoded without
the need for hardwiring of single neurons to any single intention.
Most abstract intentions are closely linked to some motor action
anyway and might therefore be represented in a similar manner.
Additionally, it has been proposed that evolutionarily newer
Figure 7. Correlation analysis for spatial activation patterns. Displayed is the decoding accuracy across time from the best cluster (empty
gray triangles) as well as the correlation of each time-bin with its preceding time-bin (filled yellow triangles) as a measure of pattern similarity
(averaged across patterns for left and right decisions). Up to the time of the decision (time 0 s) the decoding accuracy and pattern similarity increased
in a similar fashion. After the decision, the pattern similarity dropped slightly and patterns did not predict the decision outcome anymore.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612.g007
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existing neural structures evolved for more basic but similar
functions [60]. Future studies should address this question by
investigating the encoding of more abstract intentions, such as
performing mathematical calculations, and the functional organi-
zation of the architecture that gives rise to them. One advantage of
using fMRI for this purpose compared to readiness potentials
(RPs) as in the classical Libet study [5] is that fMRI allows the
investigation of the whole brain at high spatial resolution. The
temporal resolution of fMRI compared to EEG is low. On the
other hand, it offers the possibility to assess activation in a
multitude of brain regions at early stages of the decision process.
Please note, however, that even though fMRI is uniquely suited to
investigate large-scale changes in cortical networks, and multivar-
iate pattern classification additionally increases the sensitivity of
the analysis [24,25], the precise mechanism behind decision
formation can surely not be revealed by fMRI alone.
In summary, we could replicate the finding of Soon et al. [30]
that motor intentions were encoded in frontopolar cortex up to
seven seconds before participants were aware of their decisions.
Using ultra-high field fMRI on a 7 Tesla scanner, we could show
that these patterns became more stable with increasing temporal
proximity to the conscious decision. These findings support the
conclusion that frontopolar cortex is part of a network of brain
regions that shape conscious decisions long before they reach
conscious awareness.
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